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ABSTRACT
Blatantly unproductive edits undermine the quality of the
collaboratively-edited encyclopedia, Wikipedia. They not
only disseminate dishonest and offensive content, but force
editors to waste time undoing such acts of vandalism. Lang-
uage-processing has been applied to combat these malicious
edits, but as with email spam, these filters are evadable and
computationally complex. Meanwhile, recent research has
shown spatial and temporal features effective in mitigating
email spam, while being lightweight and robust.
In this paper, we leverage the spatio-temporal properties
of revision metadata to detect vandalism on Wikipedia. An
administrative form of reversion called rollback enables the
tagging of malicious edits, which are contrasted with non-
offending edits in numerous dimensions. Crucially, none of
these features require inspection of the article or revision
text. Ultimately, a classifier is produced which flags vandal-
ism at performance comparable to the natural-language ef-
forts we intend to complement (85% accuracy at 50% recall).
The classifier is scalable (processing 100+ edits a second)
and has been used to locate over 5,000 manually-confirmed
incidents of vandalism outside our labeled set.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wikipedia [2], the collaboratively edited encyclopedia, is
among the most prominent websites on the Internet today.
Despite evidence suggesting its accuracy is comparable to
that of traditional encyclopedias [7], Wikipedia’s credibility
is criticized. These criticisms are often rooted in inaccuracies
resulting from blatantly unproductive or false edits. Such
malicious edits constitute vandalism, which we informally
define as any edit which is non-value adding, offensive, or
destructive in its removal of content. The motives of vandals
vary (profit, narcissism, political agendas, etc.), but their
impact is large. One study [13], concluded there have been
hundreds of millions of damaged page-views.
Detecting vandalism on Wikipedia is difficult, and current
techniques often utilize natural language processing (NLP).
While blatant occurrences may be easy to catch (e.g., of-
fensive speech), finding more subtle incidents (e.g., someone
placing their own name in a historical narrative) is extremely
challenging. For this reason, we were motivated to exam-
ine revision metadata as an alternative means of detection.
Metadata includes information about the edit such as; when
it was made, who made it, and what article it was made on.
In this paper, we show that malicious edit metadata ex-
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hibits spatial and temporal properties (see Sec. 2.2) unlike
those associated with innocent edits. Simple features include
the edit time-of-day, revision comment length, etc.. More
interesting are the aggregate features, which combine time-
decayed behavioral observations (feedback) to create repu-
tation values for single-entities (user, article) and spatial-
groupings thereof (geographical region, content categories).
Feedback is gathered using an administrative (and therefore,
trusted) form of reversion called rollback.
Exploiting these features, we produce a lightweight clas-
sifier capable of identifying vandalism at rates compara-
ble to NLP efforts. While NLP techniques have drawbacks
(evadability, computational complexity, and language de-
pendence) that our approach does not, it is our intention
to complement such classifiers, not compete against them.
Summarily, the novelty of our approach is three-fold:
1. The methodology uses exclusively revision metadata.
2. By using rollbacks as the basis for vandalism tagging,
the experimental set is large and accurate.
3. A small feature-set enables lightweight classification,
which is practical at Wikipedia-scale.
Given the inherent difficulty in locating vandalism, we
believe our classifier should be used as an intelligent routing
tool (i.e., rather than reverting edits automatically, it should
direct humans to potential vandalism for inspection). We
test our classifier in this manner – and produce a corpus of
over 5,000 manually-verified incidents in the process.
2. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
2.1 Classification and Valuation
There have been many attempts to valuate the entities on
Wikipedia – articles [14, 18], authors [3, 4], and individual
edits have all been studied. The work presented herein, like
all vandalism-focused efforts [12, 15], operates at the edit
level. Although work at other granularity is related, for
brevity we examine only edit-level techniques.
These systems begin by establishing tagged incidents of
vandalism to analyze. Potthast et al. [12] rely on a manu-
ally labeled corpus. Others [13, 15] analyze revision com-
ments and hash article content to determine where reverts
have taken place. Our technique builds upon the latter, uti-
lizing reverts initiated by privileged (and therefore, trusted)
users called rollbacks. The benefits of rollback-based label-
ing are three-fold: (1) It can be completely automated, (2)
It permits high confidence in the tags, and (3) It allows
Wikipedia administrators to define vandalism on a per-case
basis, rather than requiring an a priori definition.
Having a labeled set, systems next attempt to find prop-
erties that distinguish vandalism from non-malicious edits.
NLP is used exclusively in vandalism-focused works. How-
ever, large feature counts make NLP computationally ex-
pensive, the features are non-intuitive, and it is unable to
detect subtle instances of vandalism.
Wikipedia [2] itself also employs NLP techniques. Auto-
mated bots (e.g., Cluebot), filters (e.g., abusefilter), and
editing assistants (e.g., Huggle and Twinkle) all aim to lo-
cate acts of vandalism. Such bots/tools work via simple
regular expressions and manually-authored rule sets.
Uniquely, our analysis does not require the article text or
diff of the revision. Instead, we use only revision metadata
(time-stamp, page-title, etc.) to make classifications. An
intuitive argument is made for each feature, whose quantity
is minimized to maintain efficiency.
2.2 Spatio-Temporal Properties/Reputation
Temporal properties are a a function of the time at which
various events occur (e.g., time-of-day). Spatial properties
are those rooted not just in physical space (e.g., the geo-
graphical origin of an event), but also in abstract space (e.g.,
graph topologies) – and are generally appropriate wherever a
distance or membership function can be defined. In the first
work in the domain, Hao et al. [8] identified 13 such proper-
ties and showed them effective in mitigating email spam. We
term straightforward properties of this type simple features.
The notions of space and time can also be used to create
quantitative reputations [10]. Assume we have feedback indi-
cating principals who have mis-behaved and the time-stamps
of these observations. Intuitively, recently bad entities will
have poor reputation, and in the absence of negative feed-
back, this should heal over time. If an entity’s individual
history is inconclusive, one should aggregate and examine
the reputations of spatially-adjacent entities, as behavioral
patterns are often clustered (i.e., homophily [11]).
In [17], we define a model that captures precisely these
notions, and use it to filter email spam. That algorithm (see
Sec. 4.2) is leveraged herein, where rollbacks act as feedback,
and spatial functions – geographical and topical – are defined
over users and articles, respectively. Values calculated in this
manner are termed aggregate features.
Spatio-temporal properties have not been extensively stud-
ied on Wikipedia. Temporal properties were touched on by
Wöhner and Peters [18] in their examination of article de-
velopment. Others [13, 16] have examined the persistence of
vandalism. Finally, Buriol et al. [5] reviewed the evolution
(temporal) of intra-page-link topology (spatial).
3. DATA FOUNDATIONS
Our analysis began by parsing a 2009/11/03 XML dump
of enwiki (English) revision metadata. The dump consists
of ≈ 298 million edits, having the following pertinent fields:
(1) Time-stamp of edit, in GMT locale. (2) Article being
edited. (3) Registered user-name or IP of user doing the
editing. (4) The revision comment left by the editor.
3.1 Finding Vandalism
Ordinary users of Wikipedia have the ability to revert
back to prior versions in an article’s history. Upon click-
ing the ‘revert’ link, such users can provide justification via a
comment field, and then commit the change. For a privileged
class of trusted users (≈4,700 with sysop or rollbacker
rights), this process is expedited via rollback. Rollbacks are
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Figure 1: Rollback Quantity/Source (stacked)
initiated by a single-click, and the Wikipedia software auto-
matically inserts a comment of the form: “Reverted edits by
x to last version by y.” Wikipedia states the feature should
only be used to revert “blatantly unproductive” edits [2].
Revision comments of privileged editors (per a permissions
table) are searched for strings of this form1, and matching
ones constitute flagging edits. Using the comment, we at-
tempt to find the rolled-back or offending edit (OE) and
succeed in 99.61% of cases. With high-confidence, we be-
lieve that OEs are those exhibiting vandalism.
All edits not in set ‘OE’ are said to be ‘Random’, as their
legitimacy cannot be ascertained. 5.7 million OEs are iden-
tified and Fig. 1 shows the prevalence of rollbacks/OEs over
time and the emergence of editing assistants (e.g., Huggle).
Variation in OE-rate often reflects administrative changes.
For example, the drop in OE-rate in mid-2009 is likely due
to the implementation of a basic filter (abusefilter) which
prevents trivially offensive edits from being committed.
3.2 Reducing the Working Set
Wikipedia is vast, yet only 37.72% of pages are encyclo-
pedic in nature – the remainder contain discussion, adminis-
tration, and coordination. The encyclopedia content forms
name-space zero (NS0) – where much of the interesting work
takes place, including 71.08% of all edits, and 91.15% of all
OEs. Moving forward, we consider only edits in NS0.
Further, as Fig. 1 suggests, Wikipedia is a volatile environ-
ment in which to measure vandalism. Therefore, it is most
meaningful to examine recent history. We consider only NS0
edits within a year of our dump date (i.e., 2008/11/03 on-
ward)2. The resulting set contains 50 million edits (16.78%
of total) and nearly 1.8 million OEs (31.40% of all OEs).
4. FEATURES
We divide our feature set into two categories: (1) simple
features, that operate primarily on the metadata associated
with a single edit (sometimes using a look-up table), and
(2) aggregate features, that compile OE histories for enti-
ties into reputation values. Discussion of simple features is
abbreviated in order to concentrate on the more interest-
ing aggregate ones. Our feature choice and presentation is
motivated by a similar work [8] in the spam email domain.
With one exception, our feature space is straightforward.
Registered Wikipedia users have persistent identifiers (user-
names) allowing their contributions to be tracked across time
1Editing assistants like Huggle/Twinkle leave comments of
a varied form, which are also parsed. We disregard rollbacks
initiated by bots, to maintain a human-validated set.
2Features requiring historical information will be permitted
to utilize edit-data prior to the stated cut-off.
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Figure 2: Edit (a) Time-of-Day, (b) Day-of-Week
and machines. Such tracking is less dependable for anony-
mous users identified by (possibly dynamic) IP addresses.
However, the presence of an IP enables the use of geoloca-
tion data [1], on which several features are built. Registered
users’ IPs could be used in a production setting, but they
are privatized from our data-set. We remove registered users
from the analysis of those features they are ineligible for.
4.1 Simple Features
4.1.1 Time-of-Day and Day-of-Week
Description: For users identified by IP address, we use IP-
geolocation data [1] to determine the GMT offset at the edit
origin. Combining this with the edit time-stamp (in GMT
locale), we determine the local time-of-day and day-of-week
when an edit was committed. See Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b.
Discussion: First, we see that edit-rates follow diurnal pat-
terns, which is intuitive (i.e., most edits take place during
typical waking hours). Somewhat surprisingly, OEs are most
prominent (relatively) between 8AM and 8PM. Weekdays,
as opposed to weekends, see more edit and OE activity. An
edit committed on Tuesday is twice as likely to be vandalism
compared to one committed on a Saturday.
4.1.2 Time-Since User Registration
Description: Wikipedia privatizes registered user’s sign-
up dates – we estimate them by storing the time-stamp of a
user’s first edit. This enables us to calculate the ‘time-since
registration’ (of the edit author) for all edits. This analy-
sis is attempted for anonymous users, but dynamic concerns
(i.e., DHCP) may encode unexpected results. See Tab. 1.
Discussion: Intuitively, one would expect long time mem-
bers of the Wikipedia community to be vested in its growth
and familiar with its policies. Conversely, malicious edi-
tors may employ a Sybil attack [6], creating temporary ac-
counts to abuse the associated benefits. Time-since reg-
istration should encode such behaviors. Indeed, the me-
dian3 of this metric for random edits is 10,000× that of
OEs (for registered users), and similarly strong results are
found for anonymous users. Clearly, long time participants
in Wikipedia contribute little to the vandalism problem.
4.1.3 Time-Since Last Article Edit
3We prefer median to compare metrics. The long tail of
time-based distributions tends to skew average calculations.
Time-Since User Reg. OE RAND
Regd. edits, median (days) 0.07 765
Anon. edits, median (days) 0.01 1.97
Time-Since Article Edited OE RAND
All edits, median (hrs.) 1.03 9.67
Time-Since Last User OE OE RAND
Regd. edits, median (days) 0.17 63.28
Anon. edits, median (days) 0.14 29.26
Table 1: Comparison of ‘Time-Since’ Features
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Figure 3: CDF of OE-flag Intervals
Description: Calculating the time between an edit and the
last edit on the same article is straightforward. See Tab. 1.
Discussion: Previous work [13, 18] has shown often-edited
articles attract the bulk of vandalism. Our own data con-
firms this; while only 2.4% of articles have 5+ OEs, these
pages contain 51.8% of all edits. As Tab. 1 shows, this metric
succeeds in encoding these properties.
4.1.4 Time-Since Last User OE
Description: Given an edit, we find the time since the edi-
tor’s last OE was made. This is subtle; although a poor edit
may be made at time toe, that edit does not enter the OE
set until it is flagged at time tflag > toe. This valuation is not
possible for editors with no OE history. See Tab. 1.
Discussion: Intuitively, malicious editors may go on “van-
dalism sprees”, committing many bad edits in a short time-
frame. Crucial to our detection of the subsequent vandalism
is that the preceding ones are flagged quickly. Fig. 3 shows
the median time-to-flag is ≈80 seconds – remarkably quick.
49% of OEs are capable of being scored in this manner (that
is, a prior OE exists for the editing user). Where it can be
calculated, it is exceedingly effective. In the median case,
an editor committing an OE had also misbehaved within the
last 3-4 hours; compared to 30-60 days for non-OEs.
4.1.5 Revision Comment Length
Description: For each edit, the editor is given the oppor-
tunity to briefly summarize the changes made. We examine
the length (spatial) in characters of this string. See Tab. 2.
Discussion: We see that the comments left with OEs are
43% of the size, on average, of those with random edits. This
may be attributable to laziness. However, as [8] observed
with email spam, small message sizes minimize bandwidth
use. Analogously in Wikipedia, ignoring this optional field
may allow one to make more (possibly, bad) edits.
4.1.6 Registered User Properties
Description: Most OEs (85%) are committed by anony-
mous users. Nonetheless, we have more data on registered
ones, namely, (1) whether they have any special editing priv-
ileges, and (2) if they are an automated ‘bot’. See Tab. 2.
FEATURE OE RAND
Rev. Comm. (avg. chars.) 17.73 41.56
Anonymous Editor (%) 85.38% 28.97%
Bot-Editor (%) 00.46% 09.15%
Privileged Editor (%) 00.78% 23.92%
Table 2: Non-Temporal Simple Features
Discussion: Given that we do not classify over registered
users in Sec. 5, we truncate our discussion. It suffices to say
that bots and privileged users are exceedingly well-behaved
while being significant contributors (again, see Tab. 2).
4.2 Aggregate Features
Intuitively, when assessing an edit it is desirable to know
the history of the entities involved (i.e., how has this user
behaved in the past? Has this article proven controversial?).
When an entity has no history, it may prove helpful to exam-
ine the history of spatially adjacent entities. We concisely
encode these notions via spatio-temporal reputation values,
where OEs provide behavioral context. Crucially, Fig. 3
shows OEs are flagged quickly, suggesting that reputation
values will not be latent in their quantitative assessments.
A general model to compute these values can be found in
our prior work [17], which we simplify for use here. Let α
be an entity and g = G(α) be the group it belongs to per
spatial grouping function G().
• oe hist(g) is a function returning a list of OE time-
stamps, toe, for all OEs mapping to some entity β ∈ g,
where g is a set of entities.
• decay(t) is a time-decay function. We use decay(t) =
2−∆t/h where ∆t = (tnow − toe) and h is the half-life.
This function ensures more temporally relevant (i.e.,
recent) observations are weighted more heavily.
We now define the reputation of a group g = G(α) as follows:
rep(g) =
X
toe∈oe hist(g)
decay(toe)
size(g)
(1)
Low rep() values are indicative of well-behaved (or non-
controversial) groupings, and vice-versa. All rep() values
calculated using the same G() are strictly comparable4 (i.e.,
can be relatively interpreted). We will demonstrate these
values, are in fact, behavior predictive. We first calculate
reputation for groupings of trivial cardinality (i.e., |g| = 1)
including users and articles (entities), then for broader spa-
tial groupings thereof (i.e., |g| > 1), namely geographic re-
gion and topical categories. We use h = 10 days as our half-
life parameter, a value shown effective in spam defense [17],
and whose optimization is the subject of future work.
4.2.1 Article Reputation
Description: Valuating an edit’s article reputation is a
straightforward application of rep() where α is the page be-
ing modified, G(α) = α = g, and |g| = 1. Time-stamp tnow
is the time at which the edit was committed. See Fig. 4a.
Discussion: Certain topics are inherently controversial and
are frequent targets of vandalism. Others incur temporally-
variable abuse (e.g., political candidates near elections). Art-
icle reputation is well-equipped to handle both cases.
4Unable to apply an absolute interpretation to rep() values,
the x-axis of Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 is presented relatively.
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Figure 4: CDF of Article/User Reputation
ARTICLE #-OEs ARTICLE #-OEs
G.W. Bush 6546 Adolf Hitler 2612
Wikipedia 5589 United States 2161
Table 3: Articles w/Most Offending-Edits
Tab. 3 indicates which articles have the most OEs5, and is
representative of the non-uniform distribution of OEs across
article space. Fig. 4a best visualizes the predictive nature of
article-reputation, which is 4× higher, on average, for OE
edits than random ones. Nearly 85% of OEs show non-zero
article reputations, compared to 45% of random edits.
4.2.2 User Reputation
Description: User reputation is calculated identically to
article reputation, except α is the edit author. See Fig. 4b.
Discussion: The existence of habitual offenders is an un-
derlying assumption of nearly all reputation systems. In-
deed, Wikipedia is full of such users, but user-reputation is
nonetheless a metric which is difficult to interpret.
Consider a registered editor who makes 500+ edits/day,
accumulating several OEs due to innocent errors. This ed-
itor will have a similar reputation to a vandal who created
an account only to evade page protections. Moreover, the
possible dynamism of anonymous user IDs is troublesome.
The obvious solution, as some find [12], is to normalize
reputation by the number of user-edits. We reject this no-
tion; it provides an easy means for one to manipulate his/her
own reputation (by making many minor, innocent edits).
These difficulties are reflected in the poor (stand-alone)
performance of the metric, as per Fig. 4b. Regrettably, we
find the reputations of registered-editors making random ed-
its are sometimes poorer than those of offending anonymous
users. Further, anonymous OE editors only have non-zero
reputation about 40% of the time. We still classify using this
feature because when correlated with other features (e.g.,
time-since registration), it becomes more meaningful.
4.2.3 Category Reputation
Description: Wikipedia organizes content into topic-based
(e.g., “American Presidents”) and administrative (e.g., “arti-
cles in need of citation”) categories. We calculate reputation
using topical categories as a spatial grouping over articles.
Wikipedia provides a listing of categories and their mem-
bers. We develop a non-exhaustive set of regular expres-
sions to filter out administrative categories, identifying 250k
‘interesting’ categories with 2+ members (31% of all cate-
gories), containing 9 million membership links.
We next apply the rep() algorithm. Suppose an edit is
made on article α. Because an article may reside in multiple
5This should not be interpreted as“most controversial.” Ad-
ministrators can protect articles to prevent them from being
edited by un-registered users, limiting their vandalism.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
(a) Category Reputation
%
 e
di
ts
, b
y 
se
rie
s
good rep. ----> poor rep.
Rand
OE
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
(b) Country Reputation
Rand
OE
Figure 5: CDF of Category/Country Reputation
CATEGORY (w/100+ pages) PGs OEs/PG
World Music Award Winners 125 162.27
Characters of Les Misérables 135 146.88
Former British Colonies 145 141.51
Congressional Medal Recipients 161 121.98
Table 4: Categories w/Most OEs (normalized)
categories, function G() is modified to return a higher-order
set, G(α) = Cα = {cα1, cα2, . . .} where each cαi is a set con-
taining the members of a category in which α is a member.
Then, for all cαi ∈ Cα we calculate rep(cαi). This process
produces |Cα| reputation values. Which of these values (or
combination thereof) is most behavior predictive is the sub-
ject of future work – herein we consider the maximum of all
cαi and assign it as the feature value. See Fig. 5a.
Discussion: Just as some individual articles are frequent
targets of vandalism, so too is the case with certain cate-
gories (see Tab. 4). Imagine the candidates of an election
are grouped by category (with poor reputation). Then, an
unknown candidate enters the race. Though the article rep-
utation for this candidate may have no OE history, the poor
category reputation may be predictive of vandalism.
Category-reputation is 2.5 times higher, on the average,
for OEs than random ones, and Fig. 5a shows a measurable
gap between the two sets for a large percentage of edits. An
edit is a member of 1+ categories 94% of the time, and 97%
of OEs show non-zero reputations.
4.2.4 Country Reputation
Description: With geolocation data [1] one can determine
the country of origin for an edit – a spatial grouping over
users. Calculating rep() is straightforward: An IP address
resides in a single country, and the size() normalizer is the
number of prior edits made from that country6. See Fig. 5b.
Discussion: There are subtle variations in edit quality
across IP space. We found that physical location, as op-
posed to purely IP-based groupings, was most effective at
making behavioral distinctions within this space.
Per Tab. 5, certain countries7 are responsible for a greater
(normalized) percentage of OEs. For example, an Australian
edit is 4× more likely to be an OE than one from Italy. As
Fig. 5b shows, country-reputation differs significantly be-
tween OE/random sets for about one-third of edits.
5. CLASSIFYING EDITS
6Because this normalizer is orders of magnitude beyond
what a single user could influence, we find its use accept-
able here, unlike in the user reputation case.
7Country mappings are simplified per our geolocation data,
other granularity (e.g., city-level) may prove optimal.
RANK COUNTRY EDITS %-OEs
1 Italy 116,659 2.85%
2 France 116,201 3.46%
13 United States 7,648,075 11.63%
14 Australia 670,483 12.08%
Table 5: Countries (w/100k+ edits) by OE-%
We construct a classifier to detect vandalism using the
aforementioned features and test it over anonymous user ed-
its (which are the bulk of the vandalism problem and iden-
tified by IP – enabling the use of geolocation data).
5.1 Classification Method
The primary learning challenge is that the labeled data-
set consists of only negative (i.e., vandalous) examples – the
‘random’ set contains both good and bad edits. This issue
is largely a boot-strapping problem, but a significant one
(if utilized in intelligent routing, we can rely on humans to
provide definitive labels after the initial training).
For learning, we use an inductive support-vector-machine
(SVM) [9], carefully tuning cost parameters to compensate
for the non-homogeneous nature of the ‘random’ label. The
revision metadata associated with each edit, combined with
a historical record of OEs, and several auxiliary tables (e.g.,
geolocation data, estimated registration times, etc.) is suf-
ficient to compute the 10 features discussed herein. All fea-
tures are normalized on [0, 1] and arranged so that good
behavior always tends towards the origin.
Testing proceeded chronologically. Training took place on
a 1% subset (6.5k edits) of a month’s eligible data. The
resulting model was used to classify the next month’s data.
5.2 Classifier Performance
Just as with training, the ambiguity of the ‘random’ la-
bel complicates our performance evaluation. In machine-
learning terms, the recall (the percentage of well-classified
OEs in the classification set) of our model is as expected, but
the precision (the percentage of edits classified as vandalism
that are actually vandalism) is skewed because ‘random’ ed-
its classified as OEs are not necessarily false-positives (FPs).
To estimate the true precision of our model, we manually in-
spect a subset of potential-FPs, and extrapolate from this
to calculate the adjusted-precision.
When manually measuring performance in this manner,
we are in fact using the system exactly as it would be used
in a production setting; as an intelligent routing tool. In the
course of our experiments, we located over 5,000 incidents
of vandalism external to our OE set8.
We now examine the classification of a single month in
detail (2009/10). The month had 1.3 million anonymous-
user edits, 128k of which were OEs (9.9%). A recall-rate
of 50% (64k OEs) was observed, with 15% of the ‘random’
set being potential false-positives (173k edits, 27% raw pre-
cision). We manually inspected 1k of the potential FPs,
finding that 30% (52k, extrapolated) constituted vandalism.
Supposing that the 237k edits classified as vandalism were
presented to a user via an intelligent routing tool, then 49%
(the adjusted-precision) of such edits would be malicious.
Of course, the recall-to-precision ratio is tune-able. If one
wants to find more vandalism (cumulatively), one must tol-
erate more false-positives. This relationship is visualized in
8Available at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~westand is a corpus
of the 5k+ manually tagged incidents of vandalism and 5.7
million OEs. Our labeling rationale is also described there.
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Figure 6: Classifier Precision/Recall/Accuracy
Fig. 6, where both recall and precision are plotted for vari-
able cost parameters. No matter the parameterization, our
classifier is capable of steady-state performance across time.
Fig. 7 shows performance statistics assuming a fixed recall
rate of 50%, for a one-year period pre-dating our data dump.
This performance is comparable to that of the more com-
putationally intensive NLP classifiers. Smets et al. [15] at-
tempted both Näıve-Bayes (50% precision at 50% recall) and
Probabilistic Sequence Modeling (56% precision at 50% re-
call) classification, with remarkably similar results to our
own. Potthast et al. [12] claims the strongest result (83%
precision at 77% recall), but uses a small and biased classifi-
cation set (just 900 examples, 33% of which are vandalism).
Further, [12] highlights the inefficiencies of language pro-
cessing – achieving a throughput of 5 edits/second, while
our system is capable of scoring 100+ edits/second.
While we benchmark our performance against NLP ef-
forts, it is not our intention to compete against them. In-
deed, given the difficulty of detecting vandalism, a selective
combination of spatio-temporal features and NLP ones may
produce an even stronger result – provided the two meth-
ods do not detect precisely the same edits. Fortunately, this
does not appear to be the case. Fig. 1 suggested that a large
amount of vandalism was being caught by abusefilter, be-
ginning in mid-2009. While Fig. 7 shows a decrease in per-
formance around this period, our effectiveness is far from
eliminated – suggesting malicious edits that can evade the
(often language-based) rules of abusefilter may still ex-
hibit spatio-temporal properties indicative of vandalism.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have demonstrated the feasibility of using
spatio-temporal features to detect vandalism on Wikipedia.
Our method performs comparably to natural-language clas-
sifiers, while flagging edits at a far greater throughput.
That being said, additional work could further solidify the
progress made herein. First, we note that our feature set
is non-exhaustive. We classified over several features whose
choice was guided by intuition. There likely exists additional
measures that could improve classifier performance. Second,
it would be helpful to examine the contribution of each fea-
ture individually and examine the correlation between them.
Third, we aim to produce an on-Wikipedia implementation
of our system. Not only will the tool benefit the Wikipedia
community, but a large-user base providing definitive edit
labels is likely to improve our performance metrics. Finally,
we must consider the robustness of our features. Generally
speaking, spatio-temporal measures are harder to evade than
language-based ones (e.g., changing ones physical location is
difficult, changing the body of an edit is not), but this needs
examined in detail and against varying attacker models.
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Figure 7: Monthly Classifier Performance
Broadly, this work has shown the applicability of spatio-
temporal reputation in detecting Wikipedia vandalism. Spa-
tial and temporal patterns are inherent in a number of do-
mains and have already been exploited in the mitigation of
email spam. These combined successes suggest that spatio-
temporal reputation could be used as general-purpose method
for content-based access control – a relevant issue as collab-
oration and cooperation mature in digital environments.
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